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1a. The Summons. It is surprising how little, as a legal academic, I have to 
do with the law personally. A summons to jury duty, however, is just that: 
a personal invitation to do with the law, indeed the law, the court itself. 
The summons included its own way out. If I were unable to attend, I 
should state the reasons on the relentlessly photocopied version of a once 
probably pristine original form. The provided boxes, faded, vaguely 
symmetrical, polite, were too small to contain my bourgeois despair. Why 
despair? On the one hand, the thought of being removed from my life for 
at least (as the letter emphatically stated) two weeks, and on the other, 
the idea of enforced enclosure, brought up in me a sort of claustrophobic 
panic. Yet I tried, substituting emotion with rational argumentation, 
enumerating in a meticulous list and in tight chronological order (see? no 
two consecutive weeks free at all, ever) how important my future was 
(this many trips planned, this many talks to give, that much life to live). 
My sense of self-importance was of course transparently fragile, attested 
*profound gratitude for the detailed and encouraging reading of this text to Victoria Brooks, 
Margaret Davies, Davina Cooper, Daniela Gandorfer, Peter Goodrich, Amlan Goswami, 
Yoriko Otomo, and to my fellow juror Anastasia Sakellariadi.
by the flurried way in which the margins of the application were 
overflowing with dates, destinations and university names. I stared with a 
certain melancholy at the lines that should have stayed within the boxes 
but failed (I was only sent one copy to work with): will anyone manage to 
decipher those scrawlings? but more seriously, would anyone really care 
about the veracity or at least the verisimilitude of the list, or is a deferral 
routinely granted to any semi-convincing application to be excused?
A week later, same much photocopied letter style but an altogether 
different affect: I was informed that my cry had been heeded. I was free 
from the law. 
A year to the date, a letter arrives again, this time without a way out. The 
summons is irrevocable, my future no longer worth listing. I am told that I 
have a juror number. I am to serve the law. Pack your bags, bid your 
goodbyes and plunge into the law. The date and place is set. I am not 
consulted. The tone of the letter is definitive, school-mastery. I fold the 
letter and put it back into the envelope, mismatching the folding direction 
with the plastic address window and ending up with the empty part of the 
letter instead of my address showing through. So much for my singularity. 
My presence is required because it counts for the justice system, 
objectivity, impartiality; but really my presence is required because it 
counts as a number (Badiou, 20081), one of the twelve, holy apostolic 
randomness, blind impartiality, blank address window.
1b. The lawscape is every thing. One of (secular) law’s greatest self-
dissimulating tricks that keeps some legal positivists happy, is to appear 
as if it only resides in court decisions and statutes. This state of 
innocence, however, is now irrecoverable. Ever since Eugen Ehrlich’s 
‘living law’ (1962), the law has been let out of the courts and freely thrust 
amongst bodies and things. We now know that everything has to do with 
the law. After Foucault (2003), our very bodies are shackled with the 
knowledge that they now carry the law, often oppressively and as perfect 
instruments of the disciplinary society. Recently, Margaret Davies (2017: 
124) has talked about the law 
as a psychosomatic product, as having bodily, psychological, 
and indeed neurological dimensions. The law subsists at some 
level in corporeal subjects in their relationship with physical 
things, not only because law disciplines the body and acts upon 
it, and not only because it shapes landscapes and space, but 
because bodies in their temporal and spatial dimensionality 
enact, create, and perform law.
1 Badiou, 2008, writes about how every being within a situation (not unlike the one 
described here) remains particular (a particular being that is needed for the perpetuation 
of the situation) but lacks in singularity. For this reason, every being is exchangeable.
Law has amply enjoyed its spatial and spatiotemporal turn, with legal 
geography now part of the accepted norm. The current turn of the law, 
however, is material: a further coil in the spatial and corporeal turn, not so 
much different as ampler, more horizontal. Questions of legal agency of 
things (e.g., Pottage, 2012; Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2014), law and 
(more than human) corporeality (e.g., Braverman, 2016b; Grear, 2015), 
law and technology (e.g., Tranter, 2011, and the whole journal issue), and 
relatively new methodologies of legal research, such as law and 
anthropology, law and ethnography and so on, demand new ways of 
seeing the law.
The law constitutes matter by naming it, forming it, including or excluding 
it, arranging its physicality and entering its molecular structure: the law 
determines property lines, permissible chemical compositions, embryonic 
biological structures. It classifies some humans as citizens and others as 
illegal migrants, offering rights and slashing lives merely by naming. It 
distinguishes between pets, animals for clinical testing, and animals 
slaughtered for their meat, determining the fate of these bodies 
(Braverman, 2012). It allows specific kinds of DNA interventions, and only 
gingerly considering others. The law is a fleshy metaphor2 for Schmitt’s 
line between friends and enemies, a material verbalisation of the 
vicissitudes of inclusion and exclusion. It is a semantic edifice of such 
imposing materiality that, wherever one turns, one is enfolded by the law. 
In turn, the law is formed by the physicality of these enfolded bodies, 
whether human, nonhuman or inhuman, material or immaterial, things or 
ideas. Bodies determine what kind of law is to emerge in given situations, 
force new kinds of legal thinking, and push the boundaries of legal 
thought and action according to the needs in hand. In a circular sense 
then, the law responds to the bodies that regulates. Whether it does so 
fairly and equitably is often a question of theoretical perspective. The law 
does transform these bodies in ways that are beneficial to them, but 
likewise often fails to do so, and its lack of (adequate) response is 
experienced as failure.
There is a need for a new vocabulary when our minds and bodies are so 
used to distinctions that are unable to see beyond them. Delaney’s (2010) 
nomospheres, Sloterdijk’s (2006) nomotopes, Valverde’s (after Bakhtin’s) 
chronotopes (2015) fall into this category. My contribution to this desire 
for different conceptualisations has been the lawscape, namely the 
tautology between law and matter. The lawscape differs from the above in 
the way it keeps manoeuvring its bodies (which includes our bodies) into 
regimes of visibilisation and invisibilisation, in the name of the lawscape’s 
self-preservation. This is something that my students, when I ask them to 
walk the lawscape and come back with their impressions, experience it as 
claustrophobia and an almost physical sense of asphyxia: if law is 
everything, there is no way out. And some parts are denser than others.
2 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2015; see also Bacchi and Beasley, 2004 for the concept of 
social flesh.
1c. Essaying heresy. Adorno (1984: 171) concludes ‘The Essay as Form’, 
his essay on essays, with these words:
the law of the innermost form of the essay is heresy. By 
transgressing the orthodoxy of thought, something becomes visible 
in the object which it is orthodoxy's secret purpose to keep invisible.
Does the law of the essay apply to essays on law? Is what we (‘we’?) write 
essays, trials, experiments? Or just book chapters and journal articles, 
blogs and extended social media statuses?
But let me start with something even more basic: the writing of our 
students. Do we encourage, or at least tolerate heresy? I have worked my 
way through many first-year student essays, the explicit objective of which 
is not so much the chosen topic but essay-writing as such, researching and 
expressing, in short a first soft plunge in the world of academic writing. Year 
in, year out, they are asked to choose out of a list of topics (role of the 
judge, law and morality, statutory interpretation and so on), and every year 
the absolute majority chooses the topic of juries. The majority amongst that 
majority forms their topic along the lines of a seminar question in their 
handbook: “What are the advantages and disadvantages of the jury 
system? Identify 2 or 3 points on each side of the debate.” The admittedly 
well produced (not by me) handbook provides clear guidance on essay 
writing. For the introduction for example, the main requirement is to “set 
out your approach to answering the question by mentioning briefly the 
issues you will cover. If you cannot do this then you are not clear on how 
you are going to approach answering the question. Go back to the 
question.” Following on, “at the beginning of each paragraph state what 
the issue is.” And as for the conclusion, emphatically “do not introduce new 
ideas!” One of the oral instructions to students, about which I have an 
extended exchange every year with the responsible for the programme, is 
not to use the first person personal pronoun. Passive voice, impersonal 
constructions (“it is submitted”) or at the very worst, ‘we’ is preferable. 
Students mostly follow the guidelines, good students at least, whatever this 
means, and produce balanced, reasonably-argued although 
understandably often hesitant and slightly wooden essays on juries. What 
is worrying though is that they regularly stop short from taking any position 
with regards to their chosen 2 or 3 points, and nearly always end up with a 
conclusion (and a whole text, for that matter) that does not introduce any 
new ideas (exclamation mark). I imagine that the argument is similar to 
that other argument that says you have to be able to master figurative 
painting first in order to move on to abstraction. I am certain that this is no 
longer considered valid, at least in trendy fine art schools, but there is 
something not altogether unattractive to it. You must learn the basics first 
before you fly.3 And naturally, I am all too aware of the problems of incipient 
student writing, and I have often found myself imparting the usual essay 
writing steps as if they were the truth.
But then, what do we sacrifice when we desire an essay to be merely an 
attempt and not a veritable trial? A trial of error and of bravado perhaps, 
but also a trial of judgement, of personal exposure and risk-taking? What 
do we lose when we do not commit any violence to the text, encouraging 
instead well-formed formlessness?
2a. En Route. What I objected to was the violence of the law. I was forced 
to be at a specific place at a specific time, whisked away from my days. 
But did I object to the object itself? an object that had occupied me ever 
since I could remember myself. The law has always been for me a 
question of material boundaries and spatiotemporal temptations. To cross 
or not to cross, and what happens if I do cross. I had learned (the hard 
way) to avoid having to do with situations where no option was available. 
My space of law was fully fleshed out: I would manoeuvre my way through 
it and try to negotiate mine and others’ positions. I was a lawyer before I 
studied law. But I might have stopped being a lawyer during my studies. 
Law became violent, oppressive, not an option but the only way. Law was 
displacing me. 
In the period between the summons and the jury service day, a different 
kind of thinking slowly emerged, one that I was no doubt semi-consciously 
cultivating too: I had been given an opportunity to face my object. I 
allowed myself to become mildly excited (without however dropping the 
despair) when listening to other people’s jury service stories. I was trying 
to own the no-option, to submit to the necessity that ultimately 
determined my freedom (Spinoza, 2000). This was ‘the’ law after all, the 
Court, the Old Bailey no less, the great density, the semantic royalty of 
the highest legal distillation. Prior brushings with the law (visits to a police 
station for my Greek ID card, my annus mirabilis of compulsory military 
service, dealings with University regulations, buying a flat or even signing 
my work contract; but also, being a son, a brother, a citizen, a friend, a 
lover, travelling or walking around or just sitting in a cafe) were mere 
wisps of the thing looming before me now. To stand before ‘the’ law, in its 
blinding visibilisation, is to have to do with the law in a way that makes 
most lawscapes pale into diluted pleasantries. In the thickness of having 
to do with the law, a slither of a possibility could just about be seen: the 
opportunity to, partly, infinitesimally, but perhaps actually, do the law.
That first day, I cycled to the Old Bailey in the morning rush hour. I am 
often worried about arriving late, especially when the time and place are 
imposed on me. Yet that morning I made a point of choosing the scenic 
route. The law-in-waiting was oppressing me, I needed to think of spaces 
3 “while standard methods are often extremely good at what they do, they are badly 
adapted to the study of the ephemeral, the indefinite and the irregular.” Law, 2004: 4
of resistance. Urban cycling had made me originally think of the lawscape 
– both the notion and the term. I remember being impressed (not 
positively) by the way I obsessively followed the prescribed lanes, and 
even the often inane London lines and cycling boxes. I was impressed by 
how well sticking to it would make me feel, and also, disconcertingly, how 
equally well I felt when disobeying the same things (for justifiable, at least 
to my mind, reasons). But that morning, I was sliding smoothly, ticking 
along the various regulations, populating the lanes with an unfamiliar 
sense of entitlement. I felt co-extensive with the lawscape, being in some 
sort of control. Perhaps I needed this. I imagined I was heading 
somewhere where control would be assuredly removed from me. I arrived 
in good time but wasted about ten minutes trying to park my bicycle 
where it would not be lifted away by the police. This was not easy. The 
whole area felt inhospitable.
2b. The lawscape can be manoeuvred. The connection between law and 
matter in the lawscape is not dialectical but interfolded. There is no 
mutual influence, action-reaction, or synthetic progress towards better 
law/better society. Rather, there is parallelism at work (Spinoza, 2000: 
Book III, E2p7). Law and matter co-constitute each other tautologically, 
indeed simultaneously. Law is matter and matter is law. But law and 
matter constantly withdraw from each other, forming spheres of 
contained inaccessibility within the lawscape, while allowing the other 
side to shine through. In other words, there are quickenings of law, high 
densities, spatiotemporal concentrations that throb with authority, 
il/legality, violence. And there are equally high densities of matter, where 
law is quietly forgotten, momentarily put to the side. Courts are of the 
former kind, shopping malls of the latter. Courts of course remain fully 
material (Valverde, 2015). But their matter vibrates with law, thickens 
with command, quickens with direction. Likewise, shopping malls remain 
fully legal, but the law recedes before the consumption drive, the 
capitalism of the plastic arcade. The law risks dampening the brittle joy of 
the exchange.
Within that maelstrom of in/visibilisations, bodies are manoeuvred in 
positions that reinforce the lawscape. The law (of private property) 
emerges at full force at night when shopping malls gates (themselves also 
bodies) shut, just as matter (dust, dump, ghosts, rodents) returns when 
court gates shut. This is less passive than it sounds. Bodies with more 
power, such as human bodies and amongst them the more privileged or 
collective or both, employ this manoeuvring to navigate the lawscape. The 
lawscape is bearable because the law is often manoeuvred into 
invisibilisation. The lawscape invisibilises the law (we, as lawscaping 
bodies, invisibilise the law) to enable a façade of normalcy, semblance of 
freedom, choice as a substitute for free will. 
Courts (along with prisons, concentration and refugee camps, nuclear 
heads, torture instruments, protests and revolutions, and so on) are some 
of the lawscapes where law is fully visibilised and matter becomes a legal 
instrument. But for the rest, we have other names (bureaucracy, 
administration, obligations, ethics, morality, surveillance, health and 
safety) and we keep on inventing new ones, all in the name of 
invisibilisation of the law.
2c. Essaying body. On the back cover of his book Essayism (2017), a book 
that inspired me to think about writing, Brian Dillon writes
Imagine a type of writing so hard to define its very name means 
a trial, effort or attempt. An ancient form with an eye on the 
future, a genre poised between tradition and experiment. The 
essay wants above all to wander, but also to arrive at symmetry 
and wholeness; it nurses competing urges to integrity and 
disarray, affection and fragmentation, confession and invention.
What a schizophrenia of desires, what demanding juggling, and how un-
legal this all sounds. It is as if the essay were an agent itself, having eyes 
and urges, wandering but also unpredictably arriving. An essay that 
assembles out of its words a moving and posing body. A material thing, 
consisting of autonomous and even brazenly strong-headed elements, 
molecules that manically flit around without however crossing the 
boundaries of that linguistic mantle. Adorno (1984: 161) again: “In the 
essay discreet separated elements enter into a readable context; it erects 
no scaffolding, no edifice. Through their own movement the elements 
crystallize into a configuration.” The configuration, this much-praised 
internal consistency, also has a shape, an outline, both figuratively and in 
essayistic terms. A tidiness of sorts that one would think subscribes to the 
order of wholeness and perhaps symmetry. But it does not stay intact. Its 
edges thicken and fade (what is the shape? of a forest, Deleuze asks ??), 
spreading next to other edges of other essays, forming a giant effort, not 
to cover more or to expand or even to convince by conquering, but simply 
to form a body. 
An essay is a body that “would instruct, seduce and mystify in equal 
measure” (Dillon, 2017: 13). But there is more. Let’s think of it as 
performing its own essayism (“An essay that performs its mode of 
attention – even better”, Dillon, 2017: 121) experimentally yet rigorously, 
faithful to itself and its organs, immanent in its irony, self-sufficient yet full 
of holes, focused on its own heresy as Adorno writes, and the fight it 
wages towards visibilising something of the orthodoxy against which it is 
poised. For this, the body of the essay must bring its object (perhaps even 
itself as object) in sharp spatiotemporal intimacy: “the essay comes so 
close to the here and now of the object, up to the point where that object, 
instead of being simply an object, dissociates itself into those elements in 
which it has its life.” (Adorno, 1984: 162). Bring the object to life by 
pulverising it into zillions of particles of life-affirming materiality. Will life 
into the body of the essay by bringing its matter forth, even if this entails 
its disassembly.
How un-legal, therefore, that the text is a body, while for the law every 
body is at best a text. (And how mendacious to keep on thinking that a 
text is not a body.4) 
3a. Corridors. The entrance was likewise uncongenial. I would have to 
brave it every morning for the next two weeks (I expected it would get 
better but that does not make the first time any easier). Between the first 
set of doors from the street to the building, and the airport-like security 
gates inside, a squeezed space made my step feel uncertain (a sort of 
French Court Salle des Pas Perdus). This despite the incontestable 
direction indicated not only by the arrangement of the space, but also by 
the staff’s curt instructions (for them, it was simply yet another Monday 
when the new jurors were cattled in). First thing: show your summons. 
That text, with its stern language and multi-digit juror number, enabled 
my relevance -  another familiar instance where the body is reduced to a 
text (passport, immigration letter, expulsion notice, military camps, 
sweatshop stations, and so on). I had to empty my pockets, relinquish 
bags, scarves, jackets and other removable paraphernalia, and enter as 
bare as possible to an affective bubble reminiscent of walking in a new 
school on the first day of term. 
I was moving on a corridor of mild curiosity but mostly dread. 
The verticality of the building was immediately displayed (“proceed via 
these lifts to the jury floor”). Its horizontality, however, will remain a 
mystery: what would happen if I were to just carry on walking straight, no 
lifts, just corridors? I would never find out. The jurors’ waiting room was 
high-up on the top floor of the building (I was anticipating a basement), in 
some sort of time-stuck airport-like aesthetics, consisting of endless rows 
of chairs surrounded by endless posters with endless instructions. Sat 
next to each other, the summoned ones were waiting for something to 
happen. A mouthful of London humanity piled up in a building of 
judgement. No one spoke. Most of us were furiously sending emails to 
people, telling them that we will be unavailable, or distractedly trying to 
carry on with work (some on laptops) in a semblance of normality. No one 
seemed to want to be there. At some point, this unbusiness was 
interrupted by a member of staff announcing the order of the days to 
come: wait until you are called. And something about how important the 
service we were providing was. 
4 How legal all those bodies of law, the corpora juris that pulsate with “text, territory and 
terror” (Goodrich, 2006: 33), always channelled through sections and paragraphs. 
Goodrich has repeatedly shown us how text is body, and how what seems like mere legal 
textuality is a corporeal explosion. Matter is, after all, inescapable.
3b. The lawscape is fractal yet continuous. There is an infinity of 
lawscapes (all part of the broader lawscape), of various denominations 
and contexts (personal, local, community, national, planetary and so on), 
horizontally spread out, “cuttable into many parts without losing 
coherence.” (Morton, 2013: 47). Davina Cooper’s work on the eruv (1996), 
the self-delineation of some orthodox Jewish communities, reveals a 
lawscape layered along the greater London lawscape, but also an eruv in 
Jerusalem or anywhere in the diaspora: an enclosure that is always 
different, yet always of common characteristics. The culturally and 
religiously limited lawscape of the eruv practiced the same in/visibilisation 
as any other lawscape (not just eruv), visibilising the poles and wire that 
would delimit the space as either a legal presence that severed space, or 
a spatial implement that liberated from the law. 
While lawscape is horizontal, individual lawscapes can be vertical, 
employing matter and law variably in order to reinforce power hierarchies. 
Higher floors in exclusive high-rises are reserved for the (über)rich who 
can afford to pay for the view and the air, but also for servants whose 
heads apparently do not require distance from the low ceilings. In some 
courts, the judge sits higher than anyone else, with the others arranged in 
various descending layers of visibility (e.g. Mulcahy, 2010). Vertical 
metaphors are so embedded in language that solidify, often unconsciously 
and uncritically, the received verticalities, such as colonial and 
postcolonial oppression of North versus South (Wey Gomez 2008), 
capturing happiness (“I'm feeling up. That boosted my spirits. My spirits 
rose. You're in high spirits.”), abundance and health (“The numbers keep 
going up.” “He's at the peak of health. He's in top shape.”) and even 
future (“All up coming events are listed in the paper. What's coming up 
this week?”), while sadness, illness, poverty and past lie down below, in 
the South.5
The lawscape’s temporality is also fractal: the lawscape is based on 
repetition. It is not taking place until repeated. Lawscaping time requires 
habit, historicity, links to origin (constructed or actual), dissemination, 
contagion (lawscaping techniques need to spread in order to become 
relevant). The repeated lawscape will be part of the broader lawscape, 
building a lawscaping practice over time. Its geological time is a 
palimpsest, layered accretions that become incorporated in the planet, 
embodied within skins, merged with objects, inputted in technology. The 
second time my neighbour walks across my garden, the third month of 
waiting to see how bad the current political regime can become, the 
fourth nuclear threat, the fifth oil accident, the sixth elephant killed by 
poachers: the one lawscape, Gaia, planet, continuum, Nature or whatever 
else one wants to call it, fractal yet one, split in infinite temporal shards 
yet all part of a lawscaping continuum, inescapable except in its 
invisibilisation.
5 Examples from Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 15-17.
3c. Essaying fragments. “The force and unity of a fragmentary work are 
precisely the results of struggle and disparities between the parts.” 
(Dillon, 2017: 73). The most productive paradox of an essay is the 
fragmentation between disparity and unity. An essay that performs this 
very paradox is a polyvocal body of utterances that surprises, delights and 
disappoints, all at the same time. Surprise at the choice of topics, the way 
they have been approached, the new connections with which they have 
been endowed. Delight at the same, but also at the turn of the phrases, 
the choice of guiding metaphor or metaphors that will allow the essay to 
speak in other disciplinary languages and with a bifurcated force, a 
common front formed by reasoned argumentation and metaphorical 
completeness. And disappointment because the essay, if it is to be a trial, 
needs to be the exact opposite of a court trial: it cannot be an enclosure, 
a theological metaphor, or a final testament.6  It needs to remain 
incomplete. “The usual reproach against the essay, that it is fragmentary 
and random, itself assumes the giveness of totality and thereby the 
identity of subject and object, and it suggests that man is in control of 
totality. But the desire of the essay is not to seek and filter the eternal out 
of the transitory; it wants, rather, to make the transitory eternal.” 
(Adorno, 1984: 159) 
This is the first, formal, step towards building a heresy: follow the desire of 
the essay. Fragment, open up, refuse to pass judgement! But: take 
position, thump on the side of the object in order to upturn it, flood it with 
other voices, break it up – and in the process, break yourself up too. 
4a. Waiting. Hesitantly, stories started to flit around that room full of 
strangers: someone who had already been summoned thrice in five years; 
someone who was trying to get out of jury service altogether because he 
was a sole business owner; someone who was already sitting in a jury for 
a particularly complicated case that had already gone on for a month. A 
sense of solidarity was slowly forming when another announcement 
interrupted us: practicalities. Do not walk on any other floor except this 
one; do not use any other lift except for the jurors’ lifts; do not use stairs 
except in an emergency, and then only specific ones; do not use any other 
toilet except the ones on this floor. You all have a juror number. Please 
wait till your number is called. Please listen.
There was nothing grand, wood-panelled or gilded on that floor, as you 
might expect from a place like the Old Bailey. It would seem that the 
whole floor was economising in grandeur in order to thrust itself up in the 
gilded bolt of the blind Iustitia statue sitting on top of our heads. The 
chairs were tired and torn. The water at the water fountain was warm. The 
6 “Enclosure not only symbolized the independence of law from political, commercial, and 
social space; it served to restrict access, limit vandalism, minimize the disruption of trial, 
and, perhaps above all, encourage deference to the administration of justice in a 
democratic society perpetually anxious about the authority of law and lawyers.” 
(Spaulding, 2012: 316).
staff were either behind glass or, when entering the room for 
announcements, professional but peremptory. The toilets we could use 
had the same tired look, except that they had a window that opened. The 
air smelled somewhat different there, less grey. But I had to return to the 
enclosure in case someone had started calling numbers.
The first two days were spent waiting, in anticipation of some action but 
also wallowing in a screen-assisted inactivity. The chairs near the scarce 
plugs were the most popular ones, followed by the ones with natural light. 
But the room was getting progressively emptier. The waiting was 
punctuated by the flurry caused by announcements – finally, the 
Barbarians7 – of lists of numbers. They would always call more than 
twelve and often many more, depending on how long the case 
proceedings were expected to last. My number was called a few times but 
in the end I always returned to the room because I was surplus. As 
surplus, we would wait huddled in the back of the courtroom, half-seeing 
the jurors-to-be and occasionally the judge, waiting for the oath to be 
taken. There would be those among the twelve asking to be excused, and 
whose arguments were rejected, at least the ones I witnessed. We, the 
surplus, would only leave the courtroom once all jurors had taken the 
oath. 
In one case, while waiting in the usual surplus mode, I noticed that all 
jurors adhered to the religious oath except for the very last one, an 
apparently Greek woman, who asked to affirm instead.8 I was impressed. 
In the context of Greek religious obscurantism, for someone to be brave 
enough to be different, especially when surrounded by mostly British 
ethnic nationals who were happy with the religious oath, was remarkable. 
I could see that we would become friends.
4b. From lawscape to atmosphere. Apart from self-perpetuation, the 
evolutionary potential of the lawscape is to become an atmosphere. An 
atmosphere emerges when one of the elements of the lawscape (law or 
matter) becomes so invisibilised that, for all intents and purposes, it 
disappears. In prisons and courts for example, the potential for a lawscape 
ceding its ontology to an atmosphere is high, since the invisibilisation of 
matter is already intense. Likewise in shopping malls, airport duty free 
shops, even neighbourhood cafes, where the project (mostly successful) 
of invisibilisation of law is well under way and a few props help decisively 
along. Atmosphere is what remains when the lawscape departs, that is to 
say, when the interplay between in/visibilisation has been replaced by one 
7 “Because the barbarians are coming today.
    What laws can the senators make now?
    Once the barbarians are here, they’ll do the legislating.” 
Cavafis, 1992: 47 (from the 1898 poem Waiting for the Barbarians)
8 Upon kindly reading this text, Anastasia told me that her choice was made more difficult 
by the fact that she was the very last in a series of jurors, none of whom had asked to 
affirm. Yet, as she said, she couldn’t start this process on the wrong foot. She had to be 
true to her own convictions before passing judgment on anyone else.
self-perpetuating, all-containing elemental bubble, one grand 
dissimulation (“this is not an engineered atmosphere, this is all natural 
emergence!”) that relies on the desire of its own bodies of emergence.
This desire is expressed in affects originating in bodies but always 
exceeding those bodies, evaporating outwards, becoming suspended 
dotted lines waiting to be drawn together. Atmosphere consists of these 
affects, taken together and made into a whole. Atmosphere is the excess 
of affect that keeps bodies together, through, by and against each other. 
An atmosphere is always spatiotemporally specific, and can only take 
place under certain precarious conditions. It requires an enclosure 
(physical or affective) that artificially separates the atmospheric inside 
from the outside; a hierarchy between inside and outside where inside is 
always preferable; a demotion of the outside to both a simplistic negative 
value (you cannot be out there) and to its partial inclusion within (we have 
all we need here); and a dissimulation of the fact that all these conditions 
have been attempted at all. Namely: an atmosphere cannot appear to be 
engineered but merely a spontaneous emergence. 
An atmosphere is resilient, its boundaries elastic and its content flexible. 
The problem with atmospheres is that they ontologically tend towards 
homeostatic perfection. They do not often achieve it, but when they do, 
their effect can be devastating on any desire for questioning, critique, 
resistance, or simply outside. While lawscape opens up spaces of 
in/visibilisation in which bodies can move differently than prescribed, 
atmosphere is static. While lawscape allows for options, atmosphere only 
offers one option, itself. While bodies can navigate the lawscape by 
allowing the law to become more or less visible, summoning the law when 
needed and silencing it when not, atmosphere reserves specific places to 
all bodies included within, without movement. While lawscape dissipates 
at its edges, fractally moving along other lawscaping configurations and 
partaking of other layers of in/visibilisations, atmosphere is enclosure, firm 
perfection, modernist orgasm. 
4c. Essaying the ‘I’. Should I be me when writing an essay? The question 
is no longer whether research can present objective facts/truths (no), or 
whether bringing the ‘I’ in (in terms of pronoun and subject matter) 
renders the whole thing subjective (and therefore, irrelevant or at best 
partial) (yes, no, so what). Nor is the question whether the law can be 
approached from the point of view of the ‘I’ (yes), or whether the ‘I’ must 
sublimate itself to the ‘common person’ (what is that). The question rather 
is whether the ‘I’ can bring an understanding of the object of study in a 
way that allows both full immersion and distance: in other words, whether 
the ‘I’ can maintain the role both of an atmospheric object (fully 
immersed, abandoned to the coercive atmosphere), and a subject (but not 
necessarily a consciousness) that withdraws from the atmosphere.
One way to achieve this is by progressively dropping the traditional 
phenomenological method (to which most empirical and some theoretical 
descriptions subscribe) and allowing the ontology of the description to 
emerge. In practical terms, this means that while the ‘I’ initiates the 
description (of the theory or the empirical work), the focus on the ‘I’ must 
be blurred and progressively pass on to the atmosphere. An atmosphere 
contains the ‘I’ but also risks flattening it, dissolving it in its illusionary 
atmospheric community. Writing about it, however, can already be a 
movement of withdrawal from the atmosphere (withdrawing in writing). 
The writing ‘I’ fleshes out the affects employed by the atmosphere, and 
shows them not merely as atmospheric tools (although of course there is 
writing that simply perpetuates an atmosphere), but rather as something 
that carries the possibility of resisting and withdrawing from the very 
atmosphere. The mere act of moving the focus from the ‘I’ to the 
atmosphere draws together the various ‘I’s that partake of the 
atmosphere, rousing them towards a possible withdrawal from the 
atmosphere. 
The ‘I’ is multiple. Internally, “the ‘I’ is both contained and provisional – 
just as important, it is dispersed.” (Dillon, 2017: 18). Sure, the ‘I’ requires 
a solidity and determination that will carry the desire to go against its own 
desire (for atmospheric comfort or acceptance) and break away from the 
atmosphere. Yet, these qualities must also be complemented by the 
dispersed ‘I’ and its provisional dipping in various lawscapes at the same 
time. We are never just one body, operating in a single lawscape, 
belonging to a single atmosphere. We are always dispersed, multiple. But 
this dispersion, seemingly a weakness, can be strategically enlisted. Use 
your dispersion, spread horizontally, take up your minoritarian positions 
and break free from the atmosphere. And follow the same strategy 
textually too: think of Bruno Latour’s thick description of the Conseil d’Etat 
(2009), and its gravitational attraction for seemingly un-legal, unimportant 
details.9 This deliberate dispersion, this absent-minded focus, those 
centre-stage curios: often an effective way to flesh out the invisibilised 
materiality of the law (see, e.g., Carr, 2016). 
Is this paradox of the contained yet dispersed ‘I’ ever contained? Again, 
only provisionally: the writing ‘I’ is a manifold and continues to be, 
however contained might appear.  This means, first, that its various folds 
are (provisionally) summoned together in order to write in a way that 
withdraws from an atmosphere (a powerful argument for 
interdisciplinarity10); and second, that the writing ‘I’ is always collective, 
externally multiple, in dialogue with others, building its withdrawal on the 
9 See, however, Pottage 2007, on how Latour’s specific focus, despite its potentially 
resistant and epistemologically revolutionary effect, perpetuates a rather narrow view of 
what the law is.
10 In Lisa Webley’s influential book (2013: 58) on legal writing for students, a precious 
sentence marks an invitation to heresy: “some students relish the opportunity to break 
out of the straitjacket of legal sources.”
working and the unworking of its own writing community. A lotus flower 
writing a polemic. 
This is the agency of the writing ‘I’ as a legal body, namely a body that 
has to do with the law (the atmospheric law of compliance), but also a 
body that, partly, infinitesimally, but perhaps actually, does the law (the 
law of withdrawal from the atmosphere).
5a. Curios. At the end of the second day, my number was called among 
the first twelve. What was to be four days of court proceedings begun. I 
was relieved to be in a different atmosphere, but also somewhat more 
apprehensive, as if the limbo room could still hold the possibility of never 
being called in (and that would be good in some way, or not). Here I was 
going deeper into an irreversible rut. My fear of and even repulsion for the 
law kept on being affirmed, but oddly so was my fascination with it. A 
desire to participate and see what this was all about was taking hold of 
me. The jury were sat in two rows of uncomfortably stiff and narrow 
wooden benches, bodies tightly close to each other, with a narrow wooden 
shelf in a semblance of a desk in front of us.11 We could not stand or move 
around, nor of course leave the room. There could be no breaks except 
when the judge would decide. In case of emergency, we could also ask for 
one. The way to do it would be via written notes, delivered to a clerk who 
would get up from his seat (slightly lower than us), pick up the note and 
walk the note to the judge (much higher). We asked for a break twice in 
the course of the proceedings. The first one was granted. The second was 
not, and was accompanied by an admonishment on the cost of breaks 
(toilet breaks, for that matter) to the tax payer. We could take notes in 
pencil on small pieces of notepad paper, which we could not take with us. 
We were not to drink water from the bottle because we would be found in 
contempt of the court. And myriad other norms that we were to discover 
as the proceedings went along.
The judge, with her amiably avuncular accent and her clarity of goal, 
commanded the wood-panelled, rather grand bubble. The rest of us, jury, 
defendant, barristers, witnesses and so on, were placed at various levels 
along a hierarchical verticality. Over the judge’s head, a crest with the 
British monarchy inscription, that always seemed to me either incomplete 
or wrong, but in either case, there to impress: dieu et mon droit (“god and 
my right”). The proceedings were tedious, referring to an equally tedious 
(as I think of it now – at the time, not so) incident. There was a lot about 
precise movement in space at precise moments, which I, predictably, 
found somewhat interesting. Yet I would often feel the need to touch the 
wooden shelf in front of me, perhaps as a grounding gesture. The days 
carried on, and I was noticing small details: the Mont Blanc fountain pen 
on one of the barristers’ hand; the obsequiousness of behaviours; the sad 
11 “the courtroom contains and twists bodies into its tiny caverns and grand panelled 
auditoria, with walls built to ensure the painful silencing of already terrorized bodies.” 
(Brooks, 2014) 
pride in allocated authority; the cold in the room; the doodles of my fellow 
jurors; the expressions on the defendant’s face; the gender and class 
imbalances before me; the judge’s well-concealed but probably already-
formed opinion; and the fact that we as jurors were supposed to exclude 
all that and focus only on what we were presented with in court.
5b. Atmosphere is desire. An atmosphere relies on the desire of the 
bodies to perpetuate the atmosphere. The atmosphere’s greatest coup is 
its bypassing consciousness (if addressed to humans) and reliance on 
corporeal desire. This desire is not necessarily to stay in the atmosphere 
(as might be the case in some material atmospheres, such as a shopping 
mall) but to perpetuate the ontology of the atmosphere. This is where one 
needs to be careful about dealing with atmosphere merely 
phenomenologically, which would lead to an understanding of desire as 
mood or feel (usually of comfort, belonging etc). The kind of atmosphere I 
am referring to here requires an ontological approach that understands 
desire as the driving force to carry on, an inertia or passive momentum 
that pushes bodies to carry on moving in the same direction even though 
the initial push has not been renewed. Atmosphere offers the perfect lab 
conditions for such a continuous movement: no friction, no outside reality, 
just a controlled glasshouse. 
Desire, in its ontological dimension, does not make ethical choices (not 
even in the Spinozan sense of what is good for the body and the 
collectivity in the specific situation). It often just carries on feeding itself. 
Fear (of authority, of repercussions, of the future, of the outside, of the 
judgement of the ones inside, and so on) can be an affect that feeds the 
desire to carry on as usual, clouding over any converse desire to break 
through and withdraw from the atmosphere. 
And so the atmosphere continues ad infinitum or for as long as it does. 
Inside, however, time stops. Atmosphere captures an infinity of present, 
static and unchangeable, and freezes it. It can be the future present of an 
Arian triumph of Nazi Germany (Borch??), the cloying present of a mall 
candy, the present (solidly founded on a conducive past) of a woman’s 
‘private’ domestic sphere, which, as de Beauvoir (??) had found,12 muffled 
desire for difference, or the non-present of a refugee trapped in a camp 
away from the country she was meant to be in. This is the atmospheric 
temporality. An all-enclosing bad infinity that silences any possibility of 
outside.
5c. Essaying object. Allowing the ontology of the description to emerge 
means also eavesdropping into the object and its conditions of 
emergence. This is textual sculpting: rather than giving a predetermined 
shape to a piece of wood, a good carver follows the waves of the wood, 
12 and the subsequent atmosphere that, according to Judith Butler (???), De Beauvoir forms 
when she excludes the body’s emancipatory role.
allowing for the shape to emerge from within its matter. Deleuze and 
Guattari: “it is a question of surrendering to the wood, then following 
where it leads by connecting operations to a materiality, instead of 
imposing a form upon a matter: what one addresses is less a matter 
submitted to laws than a materiality possessing a nomos” (1988: 451). 
Listening to the nomos (i.e., the internal, diffused rules of navigating a 
polyvocal space) of materiality rather than imposing the law on matter 
means: use matter (the wood, the text), not by submitting it to a law (of 
predetermined conclusion) but by allowing through it the emergence of a 
diffused, manifold, nomic materiality (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2014). 
Listening to the object and its conditions of emergence is our way, as 
essayists, to flesh out the strains, marks and wounds of the object itself: 
its gender oppression, its colonial exploitation, its heteronormative 
persuasion, its paternalistic force, its racial exclusion, its class slippage, its 
shaded mirroring of our own little worlds.
Textual hylomorphism (passing from matter to form, and not the other 
way) seems to be the exact opposite of the way we are taught (and the 
way we teach) to write essays. Unless you know exactly what you want to 
say, do not even start. Go back to the question. But how to know where 
the text will take you before you enter it? How to leave behind the all-
consuming atmosphere of the self with its preconceptions, if not by 
listening to something else, something other? 
The next step, however, is the hardest: to reinsert the ‘I’, after having 
allowed the text to emerge materially. In reality, the ‘I’ never leaves the 
text. The ‘I’ should nourish and be nourished by the text, discover its 
continuum with it, and add to the singularity that the ‘I’ is, but only once it 
will have lost itself in the text. Losing the ‘I’ means surrendering to 
hylomorphism, accepting vulnerability, facing fragility. Losing the ‘I’ 
means becoming stronger. This ‘I’, now fully collective, fully immersed in 
matter, fully material, needs to return and take up its responsibility.
6a. Guilty. The various juries would converge for lunch at the limbo room. 
Different courts would decide their individual lunch times but on the 
fourth day I managed to find the Greek juror I had noticed in the other 
court. Anastasia, as I found out, was an archaeologist who had been living 
in London for the past decade or so. We formed a small collective of sorts. 
We shared affects of boredom, impatience, tiredness, cold, bad backs 
(those benches), irrational (we know now) but genuine fears that our 
cases could easily go on forever, chocolate biscuits and even interest (I 
gathered that hers was more engaging than mine, although we were not 
allowed to talk about it), but not quite fear or anxiety over the law. I was 
not able to communicate it, and she did not seem affected by it in the 
same way. But there was something barely disguised behind the daily 
cycling, the action bits of the proceedings, even the breaks in the toilet 
with the open window. A melancholy saturated the whole building and 
everything in it, perhaps a distinctly legal melancholy that I took on like a 
shawl to protect me against the cold courtroom, a defensive layer of 
distance, but also an immersion: we are here to judge and judge with 
serious consequences.13 
The melancholy had colonised the air we were breathing. On the corridor 
leading to the courtroom where my case was taking place, torture 
instruments were exhibited in glass boxes. The barristers were fluttering 
around, buoyant in what seemed like their very own fish bowl, and the 
jurors were lining up with a false display of purpose. At one point, 
probably because I made a mistake but possibly not, I found myself using 
the urinal (yes, those open male ones) next to one of the barristers in my 
case. He smiled, winningly I thought, and carried on.14 
That was a male place, a place for winners, the ones who have nothing to 
fear, the ones who stand on the right side of the law. So why was I, a juror 
in full white, male privilege, being made to feel that I was constantly at 
risk of crossing a line, never to be crossed? that I was not standing on the 
right side of the law? Why was I feeling guilty?
6b. Atmosphere is fragility. Engineering an atmosphere is an unstable 
affair. It relies for its emergence and perpetuation on the desire of the 
bodies to perpetuate the atmosphere. If, however, a body desires 
otherwise, and desires it strongly, it might manage to withdraw from the 
atmosphere. Then, the atmosphere becomes something different – 
perhaps a different atmosphere, or a return to a lawscape (same lawscape 
as before or a reoriented version). This, however, depends on various 
factors. First, it depends on the strength of the particular body in relation 
to the strength of the atmospheric matter or law. A collective body (every 
body is collective, but the specific body needs also to be) organised and 
with a vision is capable of bringing about the collapse of an atmosphere, 
even an established one, as we have seen in cases like Cairo’s Tahrir 
Square. Second, it depends on the atmospheric resilience and its ability to 
have already contained or even instrumentalised occurrences of dissent, 
conflict, revolt, and other affects such as boredom, vulnerability, fear, and 
so on. Third, it depends on the prior lawscape and its ability to be 
transformed to a lawscape that will serve better the withdrawing body. 
Fourth, well, it depends on other things too, such as power imbalances, 
climatological conditions, etc. Just as there is no prescription to 
13 Peter Goodrich’s comment on this part of the text deserves its own, fully unreferenced, 
footnote: “The atmosphere of melancholia reflects – projects – your clinging to your life, 
your critical (scholarly/academic) distance, the entering but not entering the space. My 
sense is that you feel that as well, a different melancholia that attaches to not being able 
to let go of your sense of identification with those wounded by law.”
14 A juicy encounter, Victoria Brooks says. An emblematic encounter, Peter Goodrich 
says. The court urinals as an inadvertently juicy emblem (“the emblem is a theatrical 
device, a mode of staging what cannot be said but can be figured, which is to say, 
shown, enacted, and performed” Goodrich, 2017: 29; “The emblem emblematizes the 
message of the law.” Goodrich, 2006: 24) that animates the textuality of the law of the 
court.
engineering an atmosphere, there is no prescription in withdrawing from 
one. It might work and it might not work, despite best intentions.
This is because, even when perfectly engineered, an atmosphere is a 
fragile thing, and manifest this in modulations of intensity. It then 
becomes phenomenologically vibrant, its dissimulation becomes that 
much more obvious, and the bodies might respond to it by withdrawing 
from it. But fragility is not unique to an atmosphere. Fragility (Bennett ??, 
or indeed vulnerability Grear/Fineman??) is a shared ontological condition. 
Bodies that partake in it can be as fragile, and, surprisingly, their cracking 
might take down the atmosphere too. 
6c. Essaying 1. 2. 3. I used to despise bullet points or lists of any sort 
when I would come across them in an essay. I certainly would not use 
them. They would interrupt the flow and would introduce a staccato 
movement that had usually nothing to do with the way I wanted the rest 
of the text to be read. 
Recently, however, I started to list things, usually characteristics or 
conditions for the emergence of something or ways to do something. I 
started appreciating the reading rhythm of the bated breath. I felt a 
playfulness in the promise for completeness, and indeed for education, 
instruction even, in terms of 1. 2. 3., sections and paragraphs, this 
archetypically legal form. But the playfulness I found most attractive could 
not, or in any way has not so far been explicitly incorporated in any of my 
lists. The playfulness to which I was attracted was not the (subversive 
even) promise for completeness but the invisible coda at the end of every 
list, the silent “etc.” (Derrida 2000). It would not have been a sign of 
rigorous research to admit to an ‘etc.’ especially when you propose to 
instruct your readers or to exhaust the law. But it is always there, lurking 
between the listed items – not necessarily deliberately of course: “The list, 
if it’s doing its job, always leaves something to be invented or recalled, 
something forgotten in the moment of its making…something to be 
desired.” (Dillon 2017: 27) This implicit “etc.”, no longer a private joke, is 
the space of ‘to be desired’, of other desires that upset our best laid plans, 
and a memento vanitatis of our supreme delusion that we can list and 
contain everything neatly.
I felt another playful attraction to lists, that was marking another delusion. 
Dillon (2017: 24) again: “the appearance of a list in an otherwise narrative 
or polemic piece of prose introduces – more or less violently – a sudden 
verticality in the horizontal flow of the text.” This verticality, a habitual 
sign of authorial hierarchy and authoritative announcement (Braverman, 
2016a), was playing directly with my own sense of authority as an author, 
of which I’ve never had a particularly high opinion (‘death of the author’ 
etc.). So I started appreciating the awkwardness with which that vertical 
pole of 1. 2. 3. protruded in some sort of hypermasculine self-assertion 
from the horizontal and occasionally even deliberately poetic, whatever 
that is, flow of some of my texts, reminiscent of a shipwreck’s mast 
sticking out of a calm sea. Lists became my own footnote for the alien 
authority we are supposed to feel when we write essays on law meant to 
instruct, educate, transform, help.
I would nearly always reserve the list for the end of the essay, often 
letting it ramble there instead of a conclusion. By the end of the list, I 
would have exhausted my will to solidity, and I would try to offer 
something else instead: a silent “etc.”, a space for reader’s notes, an 
ironic, baroque grin at my burdensome authority,15 or simply just some 
more horizontality.
7a. The other room. The proceedings of the case over, the jury begun its 
deliberations. A short secret door, which we had never used before, 
opened up behind us, and we found ourselves in a corridor with a series of 
identical shut doors. We were led by the clerk through one of them and 
into a room where we would spend the next three days deliberating. Small 
room, large round table, wood panelling, en suite toilet, agreed knocks on 
the door, locked in, ready go. No professions were declared, no 
background was sought, only what we were presented with was to be 
discussed. The rut was deepening.
I remember thinking, this is what Derrida (??) meant when he talked about 
how the whole legal edifice had to collapse before taking a decision. I felt 
that the judgement we were asked to make should come from a different 
place. Somewhere less judgemental I suppose. Or less legal and more, 
what, ethical? affective? and what is the difference? I remember knocks 
on the door, are we there yet? the judge urges you to reach a decision 
today. Tomorrow, ok, but you are not allowed to go home, we will provide 
alternative accommodation. Final day today I hope. Our bodies were 
aching, etiolated desires that aimed for justice but ended up going in 
circles. I do not remember much else. I was not taking notes, and even if I 
were, I was not supposed to have taken them with me. This was almost a 
decade ago now and at the time I was not planning on writing on it.
We reached a unanimous decision.
7b. The withdrawing body. Even if a body withdraws, it remains fragile.
7c. Essaying justice. Writing an essay, in the ways I have tried to discuss 
so far, is a trial. It is not a legal trial, in the sense of enclosure and 
definitive conclusion, yet it generates the law because it opens up to the 
trying materiality of the object and its conditions. This opening allows for 
15 “I would define the baroque as that style that deliberately exhausts (or tries to exhaust) 
its own possibilities, and that borders on self-caricature.” Borges, 2001: 4, from the 1954 
preface.
the hesitant emergence of a law, indeed of a lawscape, that is no longer 
espoused to forming matter according to its own lawscaping habits, but 
listens to the hylomoprhism of its object (which is the law, but also the 
text itself). 
An essay that listens deeply to a law that in its turn listens deeply to its 
object. The law of the essay, the essay on the law:16 convergence that 
keeps the law turning (textual turn, deconstructive turn, spatial turn, 
corporeal turn, material turn, future turn) and churning out invisibilities, 
which, as Adorno says, are in the interest of the orthodoxy to remain 
invisible. But we withdraw from it.
Still, we must not be fooled. Withdrawing might also end up becoming an 
atmosphere. No turning, no revolt or revolution lasts. And while rendering 
some things visible, other things necessarily become invisible. The essay 
constructs its own atmosphere, assembled by the collective desire of the 
writing ‘I’s to carry on (critiquing, constructing, transforming, analysing). 
We forget that atmospheres emerge even in the fight against an existing 
atmosphere. Heresy can also become orthodoxy. It is hard to withdraw 
from this new, ‘right’ atmosphere. It is lamentably comfortable, it is what 
the REF wants, it is what one’s readers expect, and so on. But at those 
points, when the ‘I’ begins getting too comfortable in its turning, the ‘I’ 
needs to return and strike the ‘I’.
This is when the law of the text generates justice: when the text never 
rests, and the circles (sweaty, claustrophobic, wiggly coils) turn through 
and against themselves, relentlessly to reveal yet more invisibilities and 
especially the ones that were generated by our previous, well-meaning 
heresies. The essay must never rest, the ‘I’ must never get complacent. 
This is not a shock strategy, or a marketing scheme to keep your readers 
reading. This is, simply put, our responsibility: to have to do with the law 
means to partly, infinitesimally, but perhaps actually, do the law; but also 
to undo the law that we have just done, and the law that has done us. All 
this, in order to carry on, even begrudgingly, having to do with the law. 
Our work of poetic undoing is never done.
8. The body. The limbo room was waiting for my return. My number would 
have been called in for another case, hopefully not longer than a few days 
but one could never tell. Relentless justice, the violence of repetition, go 
through all this again, different but same perhaps. Anastasia, I assumed, 
16 Michel de Montaigne, the inventor of the term ‘essay’ (‘essai’, usually translated as 
‘trial’) and to some extent its form, was originally a lawyer, who fought against the law 
with characteristic literary vehemence, and in particular law’s ability to generate justice 
(“there is nothing just in itself, [that] laws and customs shape justice” Montaigne, 1991: 
1022) by erecting the law of the essay, the trials of the open form, and a justice of legal 
fictions (“even our system of law, they say, bases the truth of its justice upon legal 
fictions” Montaigne, 1991: 603).
would have already been called on a second case.17 My body however had 
other plans. My back had started playing up during the week on the 
wooden bench and the cold room, and had completely given up by the 
time we had reached the end of the case. The emotional stress of the 
case, combined with the fact that I (and I think, most people) had to catch 
up with our regular job every evening following the intense days in court, 
was perhaps too much. (I have never been very good at juggling things. 
Yet, every summer, standing as upright as I can in the shallow sea, with 
seawater half-way up my body, I try to juggle three juicy peaches. I 
always fail, and they quickly end up in the water. We eat them up anyway, 
sweet with an underlining sourness and the saltiness of the seawater on 
their skin.) 
The doctor suggested that I be excused from further service. Odd 
subjunctive. Perhaps is needed to lend to the subjective, this fragile 
corporeal subjective, a steady embrace. Letter sent and medical 
recommendation accepted. 
I still felt guilty. Guilty even for my own body that has refused to be the 
body that the law wanted it to be. There was a failure in me but also a 
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